HUDSONS VERSUS THE FIRST NEW GUINEA OSCARS by Michael John Claringbould

This exclusive and detailed article for the Aerothentic Website has been assembled with the most meticulous research, involving Japanese, Australian and U.S records. Michael wishes to especially acknowledge the assistance of Japanese aviation historian Hiroshi Ichimura whose father flew with the JAAF in WW2. This article explores how the first Japanese Army (as opposed to Navy) fighter unit entered combat in the New Guinea theatre. In WW2 single-engined Japanese fighters were often and mistakenly referred to as a “ZEKE” or “ZERO”. Many were, in fact, Ki-43 OSCARs. It is time to set the record straight.

It was late 1942, and the Japanese occupation of New Guinea was at its zenith. Whilst the Japanese Navy had carried the brunt of the aerial offensive so far in New Guinea, the Army had recently arrived at Rabaul in the form of forty-eight Ki-43-Ib OSCARS of the 11th Sentai. The journey down had been risky, flying in formation with a Ki-48 ‘LILY’ light bomber which had navigated them all the way from Truk to Rabaul. They now constituted the sole and first Army fighter unit in the New Guinea theater, and their early-model OSCARs had arrived at Vunakanau, Rabaul, on 18^th December 1942 with fifty-seven pilots to fly them. The unit was viewed as a crack one. It had attracted prestige to the Imperial Army through its combat history in Indo-China and elsewhere. It had been formed on the 31^st of August 1938 at Harbin, Manchuria, with Ki-27 ‘NATE’ fighters.

The very first combat between the newly-arrived OSCARs and Allied aircraft occurred when 43^rd Bombardment Group Fortresses bombed Rabaul on the morning of 22^nd December 1942. Lt Yanagawa lead three Ki-43s of the unit’s 2nd Chutai which attacked one of the Fortresses over St George Channel at 22,000 ft. The OSCARS expended all their 12.7mm ammunition, but inflicted no visible damage to the bomber. The next day the unit’s entire 3^rd Chutai chased another Fortress in a running half-hour battle, again with no visible effect. Back at Rabaul there was strong rivalry between the Japanese Army and Navy pilots. After this battle Navy ZERO pilots derided their OSCAR counterparts, saying that the Army could never bring down a Fortress with 12.7mm machine guns, for surely they found it difficult enough with 20mm cannon. The JAAF pilots subsequently decided that head-on attacks from slightly above should be most effective against American Fortresses.

By mid-December 1942 the Buna/ Gona campaign was in full swing, and Allied forces desperately needed transport flights to deliver food and ammunition to carry the fight. The transport aircraft situation was critically short however, and Lt-General George Churchill Kenney, Commander of Allied Air Forces, South West Pacific Area

“. . . wired Arnold [Commanding General USAAF] that I'd simply have to have some more airplanes pretty soon because those I had were getting worn out fast and, in spite of everything we did about it, we did lose airplanes once in a while and others got so badly shot up that they were only good for spare parts to repair others . . . insufficient replacements were getting through to me, so I asked the Australian Air Minister Drakeford to help me out. He came through immediately. I got a message from him saying that he was sending me . . . fifteen Hudsons from his training command, manned by youngsters who hadn't had much time but would get experience by hauling loads in New Guinea”.

“Special transport flights" would operate from Port Moresby’s Wards and Schwimmer Dromes to reinforce transport operations into the Buna combat zone. Initially only twelve Hudsons were available, including : A16‑1, A16‑3, A16‑30, A16‑36, A16‑45, A16‑102, A16‑105, A16‑114, A16‑127, and A16‑128 . This “special” Hudson detachment was under the command of Squadron Leader O. B. ‘Pat’ Hall of No. 1 Operational Training Unit, based at Bairnsdale. Despite Kenney's comments, Hall's crews were amongst the more experienced in the RAAF. Most pilots, for example, were already accomplished Hudson captains and several had seen active combat. The Hudsons departed Bairnsdale at 0700 hours on 10 December 1942, and made their way to Port Moresby via Narromine, Charleville, and Townsville.

Until recently the 11^th Sentai had confined its debut into the New Guinea theatre with patrols over Rabaul, but the JAAF was now tasked to make a blatant effort to interrupt the ongoing Allied air supply and evacuation airtrain for the Buna campaign. The Imperial Navy would not join the battle, being preoccupied with the see-saw campaign for Guadalcanal. Accordingly, a substantial detachment of 11^th Sentai fighters from the unit’s 1^st and Headquarters Chutais was dispatched from Vunakanau to Malahang airfield, some ten kilometres north-west of Lae. For the first few days after their arrival at Malahang they only flew familiarization patrols. Then the 11^th Sentai was ready to fight. It was mid-morning, Boxing Day, 1942.

At 0953 hours local, eleven Ki-43-Is of the 1^st Chutai complemented by four more from the Headquarters Chutai departed Malahang, and were led South-east at 13,000 ft by Captain Miyabayashi towards Dobodura, just over 300 kilometres distant. It would take them just over an hour to get there. Shortly after their departure, two separate P-40E Warhawk patrols from the US 9^th Squadron launched from the Port Moresby’s satellite field called Durand. Air protection for the Buna campaign was being taken seriously by Allied Command. The No. 1 Operational Training Unit Hudsons had commenced their Dobodura shuttle runs to Port Moresby early that morning.

The weather for the past few days in the Port Moresby area had not been good, but it had cleared that morning. The 9^th Squadron Warhawks wove and climbed through intermittent rain showers and negotiated a gap in the Owen Stanley Mountains towards Buna. 1/Lt "Big John" John D. Landers led the second patrol of twelve Warhawks - White Flight cruised at 14,000 feet, followed by Blue Flight at 10,000 ft and Red Flight at 8,000 ft. The plan was to orbit Dobodura and keep trouble away. Just as they arrived, the Dobodura air controller urgently called for fighter cover, as "ZEKEs" were approaching the field. On the field were several Hudsons. Landers ordered "tanks away" and the Warhawks broke left and downwards. Blue Flight made first contact as veteran pilot 1/Lt James "Duckbutt" Watkins and wingman 2/Lt Art Wenige held together to make a coordinated pass through the OSCARS. Blue Leader 1/Lt Bill Levitan and wingman 2/Lt Bill Sells separated in the first hard turn, but then found the enemy fighters beneath the hazy overcast.

The initial strafing attack by the Japanese caused confusion, complicated further by the American fighters as they now entered the fray. RAAF “training” Hudsons were about to be mauled. As Red flight dove through the overcast, elements lost formation and each other and thereafter remained dangerously separated throughout much of the fight. In his first ever combat, wingman 2/Lt Bob “Mac” McDaris claimed a “ZEKE" destroyed and another heavily damaged, but then failed to relocate his flight leader, so made for a lonely solo return to Port Moresby over the Owen Stanleys. Similarly, 2/Lt John "Baggie" Bagdasarian chased an OSCAR off the tail of “Duckbutt” Watkins, but the Allison in his P-40E overheated, so he set his Warhawk down on one of Dobodura’s grass runways.

The several RAAF Hudsons meanwhile taxiing on Dobodura’s grassy surface, faced the tough decision of whether to make a run for it, or remain on the ground and be strafed. Hudson crews faced a tough call. Making snap decisions, and calculating sizeable risks, several pilots firewalled throttles to clear the area and hopefully leave the enemy behind. It was not to be.

Five OSCARS stalked Wing Commodore F. Landrey’s Hudson, A16-127, immediately after it retracted wheels. Landrey’s low‑level evasive tactics were successful however and his Hudson returned to Port Moresby safely, although its turret gunner, Sergeant Ross, was slightly wounded. Whilst enemy bullets had burst the Hudson's tyres and perforated the airframe, Ross was adamant that his bullets had hit one of the attackers, although with unobserved results.

In similar circumstances, Hudson A16-2, piloted by Squadron Leader Hall was set upon by an estimated seven OSCARs. While Hall too used low‑level evasion tactics, his gunner claimed one enemy fighter, another probably destroyed and damaged a third. Hall's wireless operator, Sergeant R. W. Crisp, extinguished a fire in the fuselage caused by an incendiary bullet. However, when the aircraft returned to Port Moresby at least his crew were unharmed.

Hudson A16-110, piloted by Flight Lieutenant Jim Marshall, took off, then ran the gauntlet of enemy fighters by circling out towards the sea. He landed back at another Dobodura strip, unharmed. The gunner, Sergeant Moriarty, remained in his turret after the aircraft had landed and fired on the enemy fighters when they returned for strafing runs.

Perhaps the most dramatic event of the day occurred when Hudson A16-3, under the command of Flight-Lieutenant Neville G. Hemsworth was attacked by several Ki-43s just after take‑off. The crew comprised Sgt Bert Rodd, navigator, and two former No. 8 Squadron members, Flt Sgt Bob Bamber, and H. R. "Steve" Stephens, already in position. Hemsworth could have refrained from taking off, but with wounded evacuees aboard he chose to get airborne and then stay low to evade his attackers. This he did, while his gunner, Flight Sergeant Stephens, kept firing at the OSCARS. The four wounded ‑ two litter cases, one Australian, one American, and two Australian walking wounded ‑ had just been bundled into the aircraft. Take‑off time was exactly 1100 hours. Infantryman Peter Bowden, of the 10th AIF Battalion, was one the wounded aboard, after being hit by Japanese shrapnel earlier that morning,

“Got to the plane, on board we didn't waste much time because I just got there in time and they were more or less ready to take‑off ‑ the crew were ready ‑ and I sat next to this "Barney" or "Darkie". We introduced ourselves and . . . talked a little about the schemozzle . . . one thing and another, said how pleased we were to be getting away from it all. Away we went. Taxied off, next minute there was a hell of a bustle from the crew and a racket and bullets started flying; rear gunner was in action and the pilot was taking what I considered evasive action. It was strange to me, I was out of my element. Being an infantryman I was a little bit astray in the air. After we had been in the air for a few moments . . . a minute or so, I realized we were in trouble; being attacked. He was actually attacked ‑ he knew they were coming at him ‑ before he took off from the strip. The pilot said afterwards that he could have stopped and got the crew off, but he had to think of the walking wounded etc and he said I couldn't get them off, I couldn't get you fellows out, you know, in time, so he had no alternative but to head for the cloud cover, which I think he said was fairly low then 500 feet or so, such as it was ‑ I can't remember ‑ and take evasive action . . . Whilst we were in the air we were hit by the Zeros' firing and the rear gunner at that stage, I presume, had been hit, also . . . bullets were coming fairly thick and fast. The pilot told me afterwards he could feel them pinging on the back of his armour on his seat. He remained at the controls and brought the plane down with the controls on fire. He got fairly burnt about the face and hands. Without his actions I don't think we would have got down. We would have just dived into the sea. I'm sure of that. So, you know, I really owe a lot to him. Whilst in the air the Zeros continued to attack ‑ I think one dropped out of the issue ‑ the other one I can remember bullets coming up through the floor and I wasn't used to that sort of an element and I wondered what it was; it was like someone pushing a fork through taut paper, but of course it was bullets . . . Our pilot was just trying to gain height at the time I think to take evasive action and give himself room to move. I don't think he intended to come down at all, but then the plane caught fire. "Darkie" or "Barney" alongside me was hit very early in the piece; that's when I knew the bullets were sheeting home to us because he got about four across the back but then [I] looked around the other side and the chap got it in the head ‑ the stretcher case, the American. When we came over Oro Bay, obviously by then we were in deep trouble, on fire with the Zeros still with us ‑one of them anyway ‑ and I think only one came that far with us. Probably I should say the other Zero left him to kill us off I would think. Then, from what I'm told from Aussies on the shore afterwards, the land ack ack ‑American ack ack ‑ from the shore defence opened up on us. They reckoned it was a Jap bomber coming in. I won't tell you what the lads said; they stopped them . . . So it is true that the ack ack ‑ they didn't shoot us down ‑ they had a go at us; probably missed. They certainly weren't the deciding factor I don't think; the Zero got us, set us on fire with the inevitable landing in the water”.

Hemsworth had ditched in Oro Bay to extinguish the fire, but two of the wounded were drowned in the process. The remaining four wounded soldiers, Hemsworth, his observer, Pilot Officer Rodd, wireless operator Flt Sgt Bamber, and Stephens, were all brought ashore in dinghies. In the encounter Stephens received five severe wounds from which he later died. Hemsworth was severely burned on the face and arms, as so was Bamber when the aircraft hit the sea.

For sheer adventure however, the day would belong to Darwin Warhawk veteran John Landers. Landers was flying one of US 9^th Squadron’s original P-40Es, serial #41-25164. With Squadron number 75 on its nose, and originally assigned to Squadron Commanding Officer Captain Ben Irvin, THE REBEL plunged right into the midst a flight of six OSCARS. One caught him from dead astern almost immediately however and THE REBEL was sieved by an accurate burst of 7.7 mm rounds. Landers broke left and down for the safety of lower altitude and foothills south of Dobodura, but another OSCAR latched on his tail and more bullets hit home. Landers stepped onto the right wing and was swept backwards into the slipstream at what he estimated was 1,000 ft of altitude. He tumbled towards dense jungle east of the coastal village of Pongani. After three days of trying to find a path, Landers eventually waded into a small village whilst following a stream. A tribal elder gave the tall blond American food and shelter, and next day, organized a native party to escort Landers along a trail to Pongani village. The next day he was back in Port Moresby, where he discovered that fellow fliers Levitan, Sells, Watkins and Wenige had each claimed a Japanese fighter.

All sides over-claimed their kills. In fact only two Ki-43s (flown by Sergeant-Major Fuji  of Headquarters flight and Sergeant Major Imamura) had been downed. For their part, the Japanese erroneously claimed two Hudsons and three confirmed and one unconfirmed Warhawk. In fact, the RAAF had lost only one Hudson, the USAAF one Warhawk.

A pertinent fact of history is that Commander of the Australian ground forces – General Sir Thomas Blamey - was nearly shot from the sky by OSCARS from the same redoubtable JAAF 11^th Sentai only weeks later, when on 5^th of January 1943, Squadron Leader Hall flew Blamey into Dobodura in Hudson A16-34 for a front line inspection. Hall returned two days later, on the 7^th, to collect Blamey. Shortly after departing Dobodura fighters were spotted approaching the area. The failed to pursue Blamey’s Hudson – either it was too distant or they failed to spot the camouflaged Lockheed. Incredibly, several official Australian histories (all of which should know better) incorrectly refer to this date as 26^th December 1942.

POSTCRIPT

The scattered remains of P-40E THE REBEL still lie in New Guinea jungle Southeast of Pongani at approximately 9.05S, 148.34 E. The wreckage of an OSCAR lies in similar crumpled condition about twenty kilometres further north, although whether it is Fuji’s or Imamura’s remains open to speculation. The American serviceman aboard Hemworth’s Hudson who drowned has never been identified, and is probably an unresolved MIA case. The intact wreckage of Hudson A16-3 still lies on the silted bottom of Oro bay at 8.56S 148.30E. Neither RAAF nor US authorities have ever tried to recover the remains of their respective soldiers in this war-grave.

John D. Landers, the Warhawk pilot who experienced a three-day sojourn in the jungle, went on to fly in the ETO where he served with the 357^th and 78^th Fighter Groups of the Eighth Air Force. He commanded the latter Group towards war’s end as a full Colonel.

The 11^th Sentai was one of the few fortunate JAAF units which was withdrawn from the New Guinea theatre before it was decimated. From 1944 onwards it served in the Philippines, then Japan with Ki-84 ‘FRANK’ fighters. It was finally disbanded at Takahagi, Saitama, Japan at war’s end. Its top ace was Warrant Officer Hiromichi Shinohara.

Sources : 11^th Sentai diaries and official records, microfilm records for 9^th FS, Book ‘The RAAF Hudson Story’ (Book One) by Dave Vincent, AIF personal diaries, U.S CILHI records Hawaii, Australian aviation scholar John Bennett PhD, of Canberra, The book ‘General Kenney Reports’, 43^rd BG microfilms, JAAF historian Hiroshi Ichimura, Hiromi Tanaka of the National Defence Academy of Japan, 4^th Ku records, www.pacificghosts.com, and Brian Bennett of Rabaul.

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